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To date, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has denied all motions for pre-trial release. On July 31, 2007 the reputed commandant of 
the central security prison (S-21) of Democratic Kampuchea 
(popularly known as the “Khmer Rouge regime”), Kaing Guek 
Iev, was transferred into ECCC custody from the military 
prison of Phnom Penh where he had been held without trial for 
eight years prior on orders from the Military Tribunal of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia (Military Tribunal). The Co-Investigating 
Judges (CIJs) promptly ordered Kaing’s pre-trial detention. On 
December 3, 2007 the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) denied Kaing’s 
appeal.
Noun Chea, the Democratic Kampuchea’s alleged Communist 
Party of Kampuchea (CPK) Secretary and presumed second in 
command to Pol Pot, was the first person arrested directly on 
orders by the ECCC. On March 20, 2008 the PTC rejected 
Noun’s appeal of a CIJ order for his pre-trial detention. Similarly, 
on orders of the ECCC, Ieng Thirith, Democratic Kampuchea’s 
Minister of Social Affairs (Action), and Ieng Sary, Democratic 
Kampuchea’s Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs were 
arrested and ordered to pre-trial detention. The PTC rejected 
appeals against pre-trial detention in both cases in decisions on 
July 9 and October 17, 2008, respectively.
Finally, on November 19, 2007, the ECCC also arrested 
Khieu Samphan, who had allegedly held numerous high-level 
positions within Democratic Kampuchea. Khieu filed an appeal 
with the PTC, which was later withdrawn as part of defense 
counsel’s pre-trial strategy, but subsequently filed an additional 
appeal requesting his release on the basis of an alleged abuse 
of process. Despite Khieu’s appeals, the decision by the CIJs to 
detain has stood throughout the process.
On account of the Internal Rules of the ECCC that limit 
orders for pre-trial detention to a maximum length of one year 
at a time,1 defendants continue to appeal extension of orders for 
pre-trial detention without success.2 Operating in an environ-
ment of endemic abuse of legal process and abuse3 of the state 
power to detain individuals pending trial in particular, the ECCC 
has sought to set clear standards of the rule of law and resist the 
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coercive powers of the State. This paper seeks to examine the 
reasons by which the ECCC has substantiated their denials of 
appeal against pre-trial detention, and attempts to answer the 
question of whether such reasons had a solid legal foundation in 
the ECCC’s pre-trial detention test.
The pre-Trial deTenTion TeST (pTdT)
One manner of restraining the coercive powers of the state 
in decisions pertaining to pre-trial detention was to create a 
narrowly constructed and construed pre-trial detention test 
(PTDT). The Cambodian legislature set out the parameters for 
the PTDT by linking the test to Cambodian law, stating that “[t]
he procedure shall be in accordance with Cambodian law,”4 and 
that all chambers of the court “shall follow existing procedures 
in place.”5 The legislature’s stipulation of the application of 
“existing procedure” is unambiguous, and is therefore a direct 
reference to the two criminal procedure codes that existed in 
2006, the Criminal Procedure Code of the State of Cambodia 
(CPCSoC) and the Provisions Relating to the Judiciary and 
Criminal Law and Procedure Applicable in Cambodia During 
the Transitional Period (UNTAC Code).6 The CPCSoC did not 
contain a PTDT and, therefore, the ECCC would have been 
limited to the PTDT of the UNTAC Code if the ECCC did not 
develop a method of their own. The UNTAC Code stated that a 
defendant may be detained pending trial if:
(1) there is a risk of escape or non-appearance mani-
fested by the absence of such factors as: (a) a job, (b) 
a family, or (c) a home; [or] (2) if there is a reason to 
Co-Lawyers and Nuon Chea sit in Pre-Trial Chamber during his appeal 
against provisional detention.
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believe that the accused will influence witnesses or the 
conduct of the investigation if released.7
There are two attributes of the UNTAC PTDT that are of 
particular relevance to rights of the accused: (1) it eliminates 
judicial discretion by spelling out specific factors which may 
result in a non-appearance; and (2) it places the burden of prov-
ing that there is “a reason to believe” the accused will interfere 
with the administration of justice if released on the prosecution. 
The ECCC chose to disregard this PTDT, even though this was 
the only source of law that fully complied with the legislature’s 
command at the time of the ECCC’s inception.
Instead, the ECCC looked to the Criminal Procedure Code of 
the Kingdom of Cambodia (CPC KoC) Bill, which at the time of 
inception of the Chambers, in 2006, was expected to imminently 
become law (and which did so in August 2007).8 The standard 
for pre-trial detention contained in the CPC KoC included six 
components:
(1) guarantee the presence of 
the accused during the proceed-
ings against him; (2) prevent 
any harassment of witnesses or 
victims or prevent any collu-
sion between the accused and 
his accomplices; (3) stop the 
offense or prevent the offense 
from happening again; (4) pre-
serve evidence and exhibits; (5) 
protect security of the accused; 
(6) preserve public order from 
any disturbance caused by the 
offense.9
This standard differs from the 
UNTAC PTDT in two important 
aspects: (1) it creates room for judi-
cial discretion by the non-inclusion of elements in any of its 
prongs; and (2) at least in some instances, it visibly places the 
burden of proof on the accused. The ECCC did not accept the 
CPC KoC PTDT in its entirety in the form envisioned by the leg-
islature and elected to introduce changes that resulted in the fol-
lowing PTDT within article 63(3) of the ECCC Internal Rules:
(a) there is well-founded reason to believe that the per-
son may have committed the crime or crimes specified 
in the Introductory or Supplementary Submission; and
(b) the Co-Investigating Judges consider Provisional 
Detention to be a necessary measure to:
(i) prevent the charged person from exerting pres-
sure on any witnesses or victims, or prevent any 
collusion between the charged person and accom-
plices of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of 
the ECCC;
(ii) preserve evidence or prevent the destruction 
of any evidence; (iii) ensure the presence of the 
charged person during the proceedings;
(iv) protect the security of the charged person;
(v) preserve public order.10
Therefore, the ECCC PTDT diverges from the standards pro-
mulgated by the Cambodian legislature in a number of important 
ways. First, the ECCC PTDT includes a requirement that the 
CIJs or the Chamber satisfy themselves with the existence of 
the material element of the charge. In essence, the CIJs or the 
Chamber (most often PTC) must be able to find that there is 
“well-founded reason to believe” that the suspect committed 
the offenses alleged by the prosecution. This analysis is to be 
done on the basis of, inter alia, the Introductory Submission, 
which in simple terms is the untested opinion of the prosecu-
tion on the guilt of the suspect.11 As such, it is not difficult to 
predict that the PTC will inexorably find itself satisfied with 
the existence of “well-founded reason to believe,” as it neither 
has the independent capacity to test what is proffered by the 
prosecution, nor a mandate to undertake such a task. Second, 
a far larger amount of implicitly permitted judicial discretion, 
particularly compared to that permitted by the UNTAC PTDT, 
brought about by the non-existence 
of elements of the test discussed 
earlier. Third, a shift of the burden 
of proof from the prosecution to the 
suspect/accused as evidenced in the 
pronouncement that the CIJs must 
consider it to be “a [mere] neces-
sary measure,” rather than that of “a 
reason to believe” enshrined in the 
UNTAC PTDT. Fourth, the exclu-
sion of the phrase “stop the offense 
or prevent the offense from happen-
ing again” from the ECCC PTDT. 
This is likely to have been done 
due to a belief that the possibility 
of recidivism within the jurisdiction 
of the ECCC by suspects/accused 
individuals is extremely remote at 
present.
eCCC’S appliCaTion oF The pre-Trial deTenTion TeST
The following analysis will be a composite of the positions 
of the prosecution and the defense regarding the interpretation 
of the individual prongs of the ECCC PTDT, and the orders and 
decisions regarding the application of the same handed down by 
the CIJs and the PTC, respectively. By the time of this writing,12 
the CIJs, the PTC, and the Trial Chamber (TC) have applied the 
ECCC’s PTDT to all five suspects currently before their respec-
tive Chambers.13
It is important to note that the ECCC PTDT was designed 
as a conjunctive test. Both prongs, the “well-founded reason 
to believe” and the “necessary measure” must be satisfied.14 
Considering that the “well-founded” prong appears first in the 
text of the PTDT, there is an implicit imperative that it be satis-
fied first, the failure of which renders the argument for pre-trial 
detention fatal (regardless of the meritorious strength of the 
facts adduced to satisfy the elements of the “necessary measure” 
prong). A detailed discussion of both prongs of the test and the 
ECCC’s application of them will follow.
[I]t was critical that  
the ECCC set clear 
standards of the rule  
of law and restraint of  
the relevant coercive 
powers of the State.
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Well-founded Reason to BelieVe tHat a peRson may 
HaVe Committed tHe CRime oR CRimes speCified in tHe 
intRoduCtoRy oR supplementaRy suBmission
The first organ of the court to apply the ECCC PTDT is the 
CIJs. Despite the requirement that each Provisional Detention 
Order must contain a “Reasons/Grounds for the Decision,”15 the 
CIJs have not provided reasoning for their findings of a well-
founded reason to believe that the accused may have committed 
the alleged crimes.16 Instead, in each case, the CIJs agreed with 
the prosecution without re-stating the prosecution’s arguments 
(with the exception of the order to provisionally detain Khieu, in 
which the CIJs went into some detail on this matter).17
Defense teams have responded by criticizing the CIJs for 
what they perceive as reaching decisions based on not “anything 
more than a very cursory review of the case file”18 and failing 
to exercise “particular diligence.”19 Further in the process, some 
of the defense teams conceded (at least to a certain degree) to 
the existence of “well-founded reason” in the contexts of their 
clients’ cases,20 but continued to criticize the CIJs for the initial 
lack of reasoned arguments.21 On request, the CIJs refused to 
elaborate on the reasons for their satisfaction of the “well-
founded” prong and proceeded to re-iterate their essential agree-
ment with the sufficient volume of evidence adduced by the 
prosecution through the Introductory Submissions. It appears 
that there is a growing consensus among the defense teams that 
it is the CIJs’ diligence in testing the “well-founded” prong that 
has been called into question. This view is accordant with the 
simple mathematics involved in the CIJ’s review, which betrays 
the CIJs’ intention to create an impression of having been able 
to canvass a large number of documents of the Introductory 
Submission in a very short period of time, denying it the plausi-
bility of an independent observer.22
Moving from the CIJs to the PTC, the PTC addressed whether 
well-founded reason to believe the accused was responsible for 
the alleged criminal activity where doing so was warranted by 
the facts of the case.23 In instances where the PTC has addressed 
the substantive basis of the “well-founded” prong, the PTC jux-
taposed the definition of the prong in French law with that in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
to find that the standard of proof is lower at the pre-trial level 
than it might be at more advanced stages of the proceedings.24 
Like the CIJs, the PTC has also not set forth a clear explanation 
of the application of the “well-founded” prong, but instead has 
declared itself satisfied that the conditions of the test have been 
met without conducting the necessary evidentiary analysis.25 
In addition, considering the fact that the PTC applied the same 
prong to each of the five suspects, the PTC used widely differing 
means for determining whether the conditions of the prong had 
been met without any articulated reasoning, and arguably used 
different conditions as the substance of the prong.26
In Prosecutor v. Noun et al, the TC’s judgment reads as an 
opinion written in much haste and without a thorough review of 
the CIJs’ Closing Order. The TC declared itself satisfied with 
the existence of prima facie evidence to meet the requirements 
of the “well-founded” prong27 in relation to the three accused,28 
but did not substantiate this finding beyond its recognition of 
the Closing Order and the PTC’s confirmation of such a finding.
tHe Co-inVestigating Judges ConsideR pRoVisional 
detention to Be a neCessaRy measuRe
As previously noted, an analysis of this prong – or any of its 
elements – can only be undertaken if the decision-making organ 
of the court is satisfied with the existence of the conditions of 
the “well-founded” prong. The five elements of the “necessary 
measure” prong are disjunctive (which is evinced through the 
conjunction ‘or’ between the final two elements) with only one 
being necessary to satisfy the conditions of the entire prong. It is 
equally salient to note that the burden of proving the existence of 
the conditions of each or any of the elements of the “necessary 
measure” prong rests upon the CIJs.
(i) [P]revent the Charged Person from exerting pres-
sure on any witnesses or Victims, or prevent any col-
lusion between the Charged Person and accomplices 
of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ECCC; 
(ii) preserve evidence or prevent the destruction of any 
evidence29
CIJs did not follow the ECCC PTDT in a sequential manner. 
A simple comparative analysis of the initial detention orders 
issued by the CIJs will demonstrate that the CIJs’ reasoning 
cannot be described by an objective observer as hewn to the 
PTDT. In some orders the CIJs failed to discuss the above ele-
ments,30 while in others they expanded on the circumstances 
spelled out in the elements without adducing any evidence to 
support their assertions.31 Yet in others, the CIJs stretched the 
PTDT to create a de facto bar to pre-trial release based on the 
rights to confrontation and access to the case file (the exercise of 
these rights by the suspects, in the opinion of the CIJs, provided 
material evidence to demonstrate the existence of the “pressure” 
sub-element of this element).32 Instead of adducing evidence 
to determine whether the circumstances of this element were 
met, the CIJs often merely re-stated the sub-elements of this 
element. This practice demonstrates a lack of understanding of 
the fact that the purpose of the PTDT is to test arguments for 
pre-trial detention put forward by the prosecution, not to serve 
as a list for the CIJs to pick more fitting reasons for detention. 
Although the CIJs have begun to undertake somewhat more 
in-depth analysis of the PTDT following scathing remarks from 
the defense regarding the CIJs’ performance,33 the format of the 
CIJs’ reasoning remains the same.34
Former Democratic Kampuchea foreign minister Ieng Sary stands for 
the first time in the Pre-Trial Chamber 30 June, 2008 with public in the 
background. 
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The lack of any evidence-based arguments in the decisions 
issued by the CIJs with respect to the “pressure + collusion + 
destruction” element made them an easy target for the defense. 
Citing other international tribunals, the defense inveighed against 
the CIJs’ treatment of this element on the following grounds: (1) 
the risks must be based on specific facts, not abstract perception 
of the prevailing situation; (2) unsubstantiated claims based on 
general assertions must be rejected; (3) the fact that the suspect 
may retain some level of influence does not automatically pre-
sume that s/he will use it unlawfully (i.e. to attempt to intimidate 
witnesses and destroy evidence).35 The defense teams, however, 
compromised their credibility – and thus their ability to drive 
strong and valid arguments through to their completion – before 
the Chambers by 
committing blatant 
errors of legal rea-
soning.36 However, 
these errors can be 
seen as examples of 
zealous advocacy 
clouding defense 
counsel’s judgment, 
and may raise issues 
substantiated by little 
evidence or proce-
dural weight.37
Appeals based 
on matters of dis-
agreement between 
the defense and the 
CIJs provided the 
PTC with its first 
opportunity to offer 
its judicial review on 
the manner in which 
the “pressure + col-
lusion + destruction” element was intended to be satisfied. The 
PTC began this process by averring that essentially the suspect’s 
present situation (absence of a position of authority, absence 
of resources, etc.) is of no consequence, but that the suspect’s 
“mere presence” in society and the PTC’s finding that “weapons 
[were] easily accessible” would intimidate witnesses. According 
to the PTC, “there are very few remaining witnesses who can 
testify to the Charged person’s involvement in the alleged 
crimes,” and therefore they should employ all necessary means 
to protect witnesses. While the “mere presence” argument is 
not that of the PTC’s invention,38 the PTC introduced it into the 
context of the ECCC without a comparative analysis of the very 
different circumstances of the other international criminal tribu-
nals (ICTs) vis-à-vis the ECCC. The PTC explained their “mere 
presence” argument through the existence of “a ubiquitous feel-
ing of fear.”39
Thus, similar to the CIJs, in most cases the PTC failed to 
adduce any evidence to support their declarations of satisfaction 
with the presence of evidence of the “pressure + collusion + 
destruction” element.40 The PTC often treated this requirement 
under the single sub-element of “pressure,” while not addressing 
the sub-element of “collusion,” and by lumping “destruction” 
with “pressure.”41 However, it should be noted that unlike the 
CIJs, the PTC appeared to have had no difficulty following the 
ECCC PTDT and did so by addressing each of its elements 
through the statutorily ordered sequence.42 Substantively, the 
PTC introduced at least three de facto bars to pre-trial release 
relevant to this element that do not appear in the CIJs’ deten-
tion orders (“mere presence,” “weapons easily accessible,” and 
“very few witnesses”) which are insurmountable to the accused 
because they pertain to external circumstances, imaginary or 
real, as opposed to the character of the accused. In all other 
aspects, the PTC agreed with the CIJs, including the most bla-
tant abuse of the rights of the accused: converting the accused’s 
rights to confrontation and access to the file into a de facto bar 
to pre-trial release.43 The TC rejected all of the prosecution’s 
arguments – and by 
extension, the argu-
ments of the CIJs 
and PTC where they 
were in agreement 
with the prosecution 
– relating to the exis-
tence of conditions 
sufficient to satisfy 
the “pressure + col-
lusion + destruction” 
element of the ECCC 
PTDT for “lack of 
substantiation.”44 
The TC found the 
lack of substantia-
tion to be a fatal flaw 
of the prosecution’s 
arguments for “the 
above reasons”45 
which the TC never 
enunciated either 
above or below.
(iii) [E]nsure the presence of the Charged person dur-
ing the proceedings
As was pointed out to be the case with the “pressure + 
collusion + destruction” element, the CIJs’ application of the 
“presence” element lacked adherence to the ECCC PTDT. This 
is instantiated in the CIJs’ different treatment of very similarly 
situated persons.46 While other arguments had been advanced 
(residence abroad, financial means, absence of an extradi-
tion treaty between Cambodia and certain countries, general 
negative attitude towards the ECCC, and disappearance from 
the public view47), the cornerstone of the CIJs’ argument for the 
existence of the conditions of the “presence” element was in the 
CIJs’ opinion that the projected length of imprisonment would 
induce the suspects to flee the ECCC process.48 In some cases, 
the defense responded to this argument by asserting that the 
CIJs failed to adduce evidence to support its assertions that the 
suspects were a flight risk.49 The PTC essentially accepted the 
arguments advanced by the CIJs and added a substantial number 
of its own arguments, such as the likelihood of the accused’s 
“disappearance from public view,”50 and “the situation is no lon-
ger the same now that he is under investigation of the ECCC,”51 
however the “projected length of imprisonment” remained the 
cornerstone of the PTC’s argument.
Despite the requirement that 
each Provisional Detention Order 
must contain a ‘Reasons/Grounds 
for the Decision,’ the CIJs have 
not provided reasoning for their 
findings of a well-founded reason to 
believe that the accused may have 
committed the alleged crimes.
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The TC similarly found that circumstances existed to satisfy 
the requirements of the “presence” element, but rejected all of 
the arguments of the prosecution – and by proxy the arguments 
previously advanced by the CIJs and the PTC when they were 
in agreement with the prosecution – advanced at the hearing on 
January 31, 2011. The one exception pertained to the “projected 
length of imprisonment”52 argument, which was buttressed by 
an argument the TC advanced regarding “detailed information 
regarding viable alternatives.”53 As with the CIJs and PTC, the 
TC failed to provide a factual basis to support the “projected 
length of imprisonment” argument and provide reasons that jus-
tified the argument’s application to the accused with no regard 
for their personal circumstances and character. Instead, the TC 
shifted the burden of proving that the accused would appear for 
trial to the defense by creating an expectation that the defense 
would provide “viable alternatives” to detention.
(iv) [P]rotect the security of the Charged person
In the cases of the five accused individuals who have faced 
pre-trial detention, the CIJs did not offer any factual basis 
for finding the existence of the conditions of the “protect the 
security” element. Instead, the CIJs offered unsubstantiated 
(there appears to be no academic literature to attest to the CIJs’ 
claims; nor did the CIJs commission their own study of such) 
abstractions such as that of “the gravity of [crimes] which . . . 
still profoundly disrupt public order,” “fragile context of today’s 
Cambodian society,” and “risks of indignation which could lead 
to violence,” and “the situation [not being] the same now that the 
official prosecution has commenced.”54
The defense teams responded to the abstractions, with some 
calling them “legally impermissible and factually spurious.”55 
Others restated their claim that, similar to the treatment of the 
other elements of the PTDT by the CIJs, the treatment of the 
“ensure the security” element lacks a factual basis.56
The PTC approached the appeals of detention orders in all 
five cases with what appears to be an intention to ground their 
findings in facts. It did so where reasonably adducible facts were 
available.57 Where adducible facts were not available, the PTC 
disagreed with the CIJs – and by extension with the prosecution 
– in a groundbreaking statement that it was not satisfied with 
the existence of the circumstances of the “ensure the security” 
element due to the fact that it found “no evidence in the Case 
File” nor “[had] any been submitted by the Co-Prosecutors.”58 
This disagreement helped create a perception that while the 
ECCC continued to maintain the principle that “detention must 
be the rule,” and “pre-trial release the exception,” the PTC began 
undertaking meaningful review of the CIJs’ orders. Laudable as 
this departure was, the PTC continued to be mired in abstrac-
tions that it repeatedly adduced to its findings relevant to the 
“ensure the security” element.59
The TC rejected the arguments of the prosecution – and by 
extension, those of the CIJs and the PTC, where they were in 
agreement with the prosecution – regarding the “ensure the 
security” element by stating that the prosecution’s arguments 
were untenable for “lack of substantiation.”60 The TC made this 
determination on the basis of “the above reasons” which it did 
not enunciate either above or below.61
(v) [P]reserve public order
The “public order” element is the most ambiguous of the 
ECCC PTDT elements. A reasonable observer would expect 
proof of the possibility of violent public reaction to the release 
of the suspect. The CIJs offered no such proof in any of the 
five cases, and unceremoniously hid behind such proffered 
abstractions as the “gravity of [crimes] [capable] of profoundly 
disrupt[ing] the public order,” “the fragile context of today’s 
Cambodian society,” and “indignation which could lead to 
violence.”62 The defense appealed against the one-size-fits-
all approach of the CIJs and the lack of a factual basis in the 
CIJs’ reasoning. The defense referred to the CIJs reasoning as 
“impermissible and spurious”63 and made specific references to 
the international jurisprudence that required evidence of a pos-
sibility of disruption of the public order and a finding that this 
possibility decreases over time.64
In deciding appeals relevant to the “public order” element, 
the PTC relied on the establishment of certain historical facts 
The Trial Court’s approach therefore does not 
demonstrate a change in quality but merely replaces 
the defense with the prosecution as the party at a 
disadvantage, since the prosecution will find it  
difficult to appeal the TC’s decision due to the  
same exact reasons the defense had difficulty  
appealing decisions of the CIJs and the PTC.
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to justify its conclusion. For example, the PTC concluded that 
“1.7 million Cambodians died”65 during the stewardship of 
Democratic Kampuchea. This is not an uncontested number.66 
The PTC also offered its expertise in medical sciences, assert-
ing that a portion of the population that lived through the period 
from 1975 to 1979 suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD). Moreover, the PTC claimed that PTSD would be re-
activated if the suspects were to be released pending trial.67 The 
PTC managed to arrive at this conclusion without as much as 
summoning a single medical expert before it. Again, the PTC 
used abstractions such as the “great public interest in the pro-
ceedings,”68 and “the grave nature of the crimes,” and the PTC’s 
perception of relevance of the anti-Thai riots in Cambodia in 
2003 as a way of projecting what might happen.69
The TC rejected the arguments of the prosecution – and by 
extension those of the CIJs and the PTC where they were in 
agreement with the prosecution – regarding the “public order” 
element by stating that the prosecution’s arguments were unten-
able for “lack of substantiation.”70 The TC reached this conclu-
sion on the basis of “the above reasons” which it did not enunci-
ate either above or below.71
ConCluSion
The CIJs have misapplied the ECCC PTDT by breaking 
the statutory sequence of the test and by advancing arguments 
without explaining their evidentiary support. The shortcomings 
of the determination of the CIJs negatively affected the PTC, by 
forcing the PTC to go beyond the detention orders to address the 
issues raised by the defense on appeal. The format of the TC’s 
most recent intervention to rectify what it sees as the mistakes 
of other decision-making organs of the court (CIJs and PTC) 
entailed reinstating the rights of the accused and granting the 
accused relief for the previous mistakes of law. However, similar 
to the CIJs and PTC, the TC lacks substantiation and betrays the 
hastiness with which the TC handed down its decision. The TC’s 
approach therefore does not demonstrate a change in quality, but 
merely replaces the defense with the prosecution as the party at a 
disadvantage since the prosecution will find it difficult to appeal 
the TC’s decision due to the same exact reasons the defense had 
difficulty appealing decisions of the CIJs and the PTC – absence 
of factual basis.
Underneath these convoluted matters of criminal procedure 
are the rights of individuals. Although the individuals whose 
plight in pre-trial detention awaiting trial in the ECCC do not 
often evoke an outpouring of local or international empathy, 
they too like anyone interfacing with the criminal process, have 
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court 
of law and have the right to have the necessity of their pre-trial 
detention determined by the court on the basis of a standard 
specified by statute in the pre-trial detention test.
The tide may be turning. On February 16, 2011, the TC 
invalidated all of the prosecution’s arguments for the existence 
of conditions to satisfy all but one of the elements of prong 
two of the ECCC PTDT. By doing so, the TC implicitly invited 
the defense to proffer “viable alternatives” to detention72 and 
suspended the requirement to “establish a change in circum-
stances”73 (on which the prosecution has heavily relied) in 
subsequent motions for provisional release by the defense. The 
overall tone of the TC’s decision of February 16, 2011, indicates 
that the TC would be amenable to ordering provisional release 
if the defense managed to proffer “viable alternatives” to allay 
the TC’s concerns of the risk of flight. This marks the first real 
opportunity for provisional release of any individual accused by 
the CIJs since the establishment of the ECCC. HRB
Court Building for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia.
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EnDnotEs: Was there Good Reason to order Pre-trial Detention of the ECCC Defendants
1 ECCC Internal Rules, R. 63/6/a.b.
2 On January 13, 2011, for example, the PTC rejected another 
motion for pre-trial release with a promise (rather than a handing-
down) of a reasoned decision.
3 See recognition of the endemic problems with the Cambodian 
judiciary in a study which paved the way to the establishment of the 
ECCC: Group of Experts’ Report to the Secretary General (Report 
of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution, G.A. Res. 52/135 ¶¶ 102-111, U.N. Doc. 
A/53/850), U.N. Doc S/1999/231 (1999) at 47-48.
4 The Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cam-
bodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea ECCC Agreement (ECCC Agreement), art. 12. It is 
incontrovertible that the legislature’s combined use of the terms 
“Cambodian law” and “existing procedures in place” excludes any 
possibility of encompassing judge-created rules (e.g. ECCC Internal 
Rules) for the following reasons: (1) starting 1998 and throughout 
the Cambodian government consistently maintained a position that 
the ECCC would be “a national court with international participa-
tion” (Hun Sen’s Interview with Kyodo News (1999) available at 
http://www.cnv.org.kh/cnv_html_pdf/CNV20.PDF; Statement from 
the Royal Government of Cambodia In Response to the Announce-
ment of UN Pullout from Negotiations on Khmer Rouge Trial 
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